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Neuhouser's interpretation has a certain "willful" quality. Having equated selfpositing activity and intellectual intuition, for example, he treats them as simply identical. He consistently reads Fichte's talk of the self's "activity" as a reference to "structures in consciousness," as if there were no alternative readings. He thereby tends to
miss the senses in which Fichte (like Kant) attributes a kind of "formative power" to the
self in its original act, and the implications of this attribution for the self's "practical"
nature. Thus, in his chapter on Fichte's account of practical selfhood, Neuhouser is
very interesting on the topic o f how intellectual intuition renders the self "autonomous," and causally independent, but has little to say about the self's active selfassertion. Not surprisingly, then, his discussion of the notion of "striving" is as weak as
his account of intellectual intuition is strong.
Altogether, Neuhouser has written a highly focused, if occasionally myopic, very
informative and illuminating study, valuable even to students of Fichte who will find
important fault with some of its main theses.
A. J. MANDT
Wichita State University

Maudemarie Clark. Nietzsche on Truth a n d Philosophy. Modern European Philosophy.
New York: Cambridge University Press, 199o. Pp. xiv + 298. Cloth, $39.5 o. Paper, $12.95.
Chapters x through 4 of Maudemarie Clark's important book offer a rich elaboration
of some ideas first suggested schematically by John Wilcox': I will call them the Epistemological Thesis (ET) and the Developmental Thesis (DT). According to Clark's ET,
the "mature" Nietzsche believed we could have knowledge of the truth because he
accepted (though not in these terms): (i) the "minimal correspondence theory" of
truth: "Snow is white" is true (in a language L) iff snow is white; and (ii) that truth is
epistemically constrained. Thus (to simplify a bit), since "snow is white" is true if and
only if snow is white; and since whether snow is, in fact, white, cannot outstrip "our best
standards of rational acceptability" (6o) for beliefs concerning the whiteness of snow, it
is possible for us to have knowledge of the truth-value of the proposition "snow is
white."
According to the DT, Nietzsche's view of truth changed during his career. In the
early essay "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense" (1873), he accepted the
"metaphysical correspondence theory, the conception of truth as correspondence to
the thing-in-itself" (22). BecaUse, under the influence of Schopenhauer, he thought we
had no knowledge of things-in-themselves, he accepted the Falsification Thesis (FT):
our merely "human" knowledge necessarily falsifies what the world is really like in
itself. By the early 188os, Nietzsche came to reject the idea of the thing-in-itself as
incoherent. Yet he continued to accept the FT because he continued to accept the
Schopenhauerian Representational Theory of Knowledge (RTK), according to which
' Truth and Value in Nietzsche (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, x974), esp. 123-24.
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our knowledge is o f "representations" o f things, not things themselves. Only in his final
six works, beginning with the Genea/0gy in 1887, does Nietzsche reject the RTK and
come to realize that his rejection o f the thing-in-itself in earlier works should lead him
to the ET; this is why, Clark claims, we do not find the FT in any o f these late works.
In Chapters 5 and 6, Clark shows how Nietzsche's perspecdvism and his criticism o f
the pursuit of truth as an ascetic ideal are, in fact, compatible with his own belief in the
possibility o f truth. In Chapters 7 and 8, she argues that will to power and eternal
recurrence are consistent with Nietzsche's rejection o f metaphysics, because rather
than being metaphysical doctrines, they are simply the foundations of an alternative
ideal to the ascetic ideal. Clark's discussion o f will to power is especially provocative, and
will repay careful study.
Let me venture four critical comments. (l) Against commentators (from Danto to
Derrida) who contend that Nietzsche did deny the existence o f truth, Clark notes that
this "apparent nihilism in regard to t r u t h . . , threatens the coherence o f his critique o f
m o r a l i t y . . , insofar as the latter commits Nietzsche to certain truths while at the same
time it denies that there are any truths" (4)- Yet Nietzsche makes such criticisms as early
as Dawn, when, even on Clark's DT, he was still committed to the F T - - t h u s presenting
the specter of incoherence again.
(2) Clark assimilates Nietzsche's perspectivism to a sort o f holism: "how things will
look to us intellectually in any situation--how we are justified in interpreting t h e m - depends on 'where we're at', that is, on what we already believe" (13o). Yet in the
Geneodogy (III, 12), Nietzsche claims that what determines our perspectives is our
"affects" or drives; he does not seem to assign any role to our other beliefs. 2
(3) Clark's neo-Kantian Nietzsche accepts that truth is independent o f our "cognitive capacities (of what we can in principle verify)" (48), but denies that it is independent o f our "cognitive interests," that is "our best standards o f rational acceptability"
(6o). This distinction, however, will collapse if one thinks that verifiability is a necessary
(but not sufficient) condition for acceptability---our "best standards o f rational acceptability" will just include, then, "verifiability." (Clark argues, not persuasively to my
mind, against such a reading of Nietzsche.)
(4) Clark's historical scholarship is selective: much is said about the influence o f
Schopenhauer, for example, but nothing about the influence o f the Presocradcs, whom
Nietzsche so admired and whose very different view o f truth he often seems to echo.
Clark brings a welcome argumentative engagement to her reading o f the texts, and
her treatment o f the philosophical issues constitutes a significant improvement over
what has been typical in the Nietzsche literature. T h e book is, at times, less sharply
focussed than it might have b e e n - - p a r t l y because o f Clark's lengthy discussions o f the
views of other commentators (though, oddly, she omits any mention o f Jean Granier's
12 Problkme de la veri~ dam la philosophie de Nietzsche3); partly because o f some belabored
discussions, like the chapter on theories of truth.
,See my "Perspectivism in Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals," in R. Schacht, ed., Nietzsche,
Genea/ogy,Mora/ity (Berkeley: University of California Press, forthcoming), sect. IV.
s(Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1966).
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None o f these critical comments should obscure the fact that this book is a major
contribution to Nietzsche studies. Indeed, o f the many books written on Nietzsche over
the last ninety years, Clark's study must rank as one o f the three or four most intelligent and rewarding. All students o f Nietzsche will learn from reading this valuable
work.
BRIAN LEITER

University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

Robert B. Westbrook. John Dewey and American Democracy. Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, i99i. Pp. xix + 57 o. Cloth, $29.95.
When James Gouinlock's John Dewey's Philosophy of Value appeared in 1972, it comm a n d e d a field virtually empty o f any extended treatments o f Dewey's t h o u g h t ?
Twenty years later, over a dozen major volumes have appeared, from intellectual
biographies to studies o f his metaphysics, logic, aesthetics, philosophy o f technology,
and philosophy o f religion.' Westbrook's contribution, which is both a political biography and an inquiry into Dewey's philosophy o f democracy, may be one o f the most
important. It is certainly the best book treating Dewey's role in American history. I
think it is also the best general introduction to Dewey's t h o u g h t as a whole. And while I
have a few points o f contention, I will begin by simply stating that Westbrook, an
assistant professor o f history at the University o f Rochester, has produced nothing
short o f a masterpiece. I f it exerts its proper influence, it will serve to educate historians, social theorists, political scientists, educators, and, last but not least, philosophers
about Dewey, his troublesome heritage, and the unfinished task o f democracy still
before us.
Westbrook recognizes that the full biography of Dewey remains to be written. He
has focused on "Dewey's career as an advocate o f democracy" because "his democractic
theory goes to the heart o f his philosophy" (x-xi). Insofar as this includes Dewey's
complex philosophical anthropology, this is true. T h e purpose is that "it is high time to
reassess [Dewey's] place in the history of m o d e r n American culture" (xiii). Against the
dominant view, which sees Dewey as a major influence in the formation o f modern,
liberalism, Westbrook argues that Dewey's impact has actually been rather limited. "It
is more accurate to see Dewey as a minority, not a majority spokesman within the
liberal community, a social philosopher whose democratic vision failed to find a secure
place in liberal ideology--in short, a more radical voice than has been generally asThe major exception to this was G6rard Deledalle's important L7dle d'ex~'ience dans la

philosophiedeJohn Dewey(1967).

, Among such studies should be mentioned: George Dykhuizen's The Life and Mind ofJohn
Dewey (x973), Victor Kestenhaum's The Phenomenological Sense of John Dewey 0978), Ralph
Sleeper's The Necessity of Pragmatism 0986), my own John Dewey's Theory of Art, Experience and
Nature: The Horizons of Feeling 0987), Raymond Boisvert's Dewey's Metaphysics (a988), Larry
Hickman 'sJohn Dewey'sPragmaticTechnology(x99o), and Steven Rockefeller'sJohn Dewey:Religimo
Faith and DemocraticHumanism (1991) .

